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March 14, 1980 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 
No. 79-855-COX Cert. to U.S. Ct. Cus.& Pat. Apps 
(Rich, for ct) 
DIAMOND (Comm'r Patents) 
v. 
BRADLEY Federal/Civil Timely w/e x t 
1. SUMMARY. This case ,is straight-lined with no. 79-1112, 
~ iamond v. Diehr. The issue is whether computer "_firmware 11 - --::: 
which controls the internal workings of a computer is 
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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- - 2 - -2. FACTS. In April 1975, resps applied for a patent on an 
invention that directs the transfer of data within a computer. 
The physical components of a computer include a main memory, 
which has a system base with which the programmer can 
communicate. In certain computers certain information that is 
part of the system base may be stored in ~torage components 
called "scratchpad registers." These scratchpad registers were 
not previously accessible to the programmer. Thus in order to 
retrieve the information stored on the registers it was 
necessary to reprogram the entire system base or to use 
software (the computer program) limited to the particular 
computer model. 
Bradley's claimed invention was an improve.a method for 
changing the data in the scratchpad registers. Certain 
hardware elements are added to the computer along with a 
"microprogram" called "firmware." A microprogram has been 
defined as "a sequence of elementary steps which permits the 
computer hardware to carry out a program instruction." 
An instruction in Bradley's firmware causes a particular 
sequence of computer operations to take place, which permits 
the programmer to communicate with the scratchpad registers and 
to switch data back and forth from the registers to the system 
base. 
The patent examiner rejected the invention as 
nonpatentable . He noted th a t the hardware arrangement was well 
known and old in the art. The only novel pirt of the invention 
was an algorithm designed to control the computer to solve the 
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The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals 
agreed with the examiner. It agreed that the only novel 
element of Bradley's invention was the microprogramming. It 
ruled that the fact that Bradley's claims were in "apparatus," 
rather than "methods" format did not make them any less 
"related to an algorithm." Since a "progr~m-implemerited 
algorithm" is unpatentable, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 
(1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), the . patent 
application was rejected. 
3. OPINION BELOW. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(CCPA) reversed. The court held that the examiner and the PTO 
Bd. had erroneously interpreted this Court's cases as holding 
that all computer program or program related inventions are 
nonstatutory under 35 U.S.C. § 101.* The court felt that the 
Board found resps' invention to be mathematical in nature 
because digital computers operate in some number radix. 
However, this confused what the computer does with how it is 
done. A computer that solves the Pythagorean theorem or a 
complex vector equation describing the b e havior of a rocket in 
flight is performing a mathematical algorithm. However, one 
which retrieves the contents of a page of the Mi l waukee 
t e lephone directory or the text of a cou r t opinion is not 
solving an equation or using a mathematical formula. 
* 35 u.s.c. § 101 provides: 
"Whoeve r inve nts or d i s cove r s any new and useful 
process , ma chine , ma nu f ac tu re , o r compo s ition of matte r, or 
any ne w and u seful improve me nt there o f , may obtai n a pa t e nt 
ther e fore , subjec t t o the c onditions and requ i reme nt s o f 
t h is titl e ." 
L' 
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- 4 -- -The court noted that resps claimed to have created a new 
hardware system -- a mechanism which enables the computer to 
alter information in the system base. Resps do not claim the 
information, and the information acted upon is irrelevant to 
the invention. Resps' invention thus was found to be no 
different from an adding machine, which is patentable -in 
nature, if the claim does not embrace any particular 
calculation the machine is capable of making. 
The court rejected the the Board's reliance on the fact 
that firmware is involved in the invention. If resps had 
claimed the information embodied in the firmware as their 
invention, a different question would be presented. However, 
resps claimed a combination of hardware elements, one of which 
happens to be firmware programmed in a particular way. The 
Ce court ruled that resps' invention must be considered as a 
whole . 
• 
4. CONTENTIONS. The SG argues that in this case, as well 
as in Diamond v. Diehr, no. 79-1112, the CCPA refused to apply 
this Court's decision in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) 
and read too narrowly the decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63 (1972). 
The decision in Parker v. Flook set forth a two~step 
analysis to be applied to a patent c l aim involving an 
algorithm. First, one must determine whether the claim 
contains a principle, formula, idea or concept, which , as one 
of the "basic tools of scientific and technolbgical work," is 
itself unpatentable. Second, wha t remains of the claim after 
such princ iple, or concept is separated must be analyzed to 
determine what is old in the art. 
__ .,, 
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- 5 -- -The PTO Bd. of Appeals found that everything in Bradley's 
claim was old in the art except the programmed algorithm. The 
CCPA, did not overturn these two rulings. Nonetheless it 
rejected the Board's approach of "distill[ing] appellants' 
claim down to the information contained in the firmware," 
rather than regarding the invention "as a whole." 
~he SG insists that the type of "distillation" performed by 
the Board is exactly what is required by Flook. 
The CCPA also wrongly concluded that only mathematical 
algorithms are unpatentable. Although the algorithms in Flook 
and Benson were mathematical, the Court's decisions did not 
rest on any distinction between mathematical andnonmathematical 
algorithms. Phenomena of nature, mental processes and abstract 
intellectual concepts may be mathematical, but are not 
- necessarily so. The phenomena that water runs downhill is no 
more patentable than a mathematical equation. 
-
Bradley's program is a set of directions to the computer. 
These directions reflect abstract intellectual concepts as much 
as do directions for the translation of texts from Russian to 
English. 
Finally the SG argues that the case is important because 
the CCPA consistently has refused to apply Parker v. Flook, 
preferring instead the dissent in that case. See In re 
Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32, 36-37 (1979); In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 
1070, 1081 (1978); In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1332-1333 
(1979) and In re Diehr, supra. The SG suggests that Diehr be 
consolidated with this case for argument. 
-
The SG notes th! the PTO presently has pe--ng more than 
3000 patent applications in which the patentability of computer 
software or firmware is involved. The office needs guidance on 
whether to continue to apply its interpretation of Flook or to 
yield to the CCPA in order to avoid repeated, costly and 
unsuccessful litigaton in that court. 
Resps -~rgue that they are not attempting to patent any 
computer program or algorithm. They draw an analogy to a 
player piano, which consists of the piano and the musical 
composition encoded on a roll. They have not invented a new 
roll (computer program); resps contend they have invented a 
new piano (redesigned computer hardware). Their invention is 
not analogous to a program for translating from Russian to 
English; any program for doing such a translation will run ce faster on their improved computer machine. Thus Flook is not 
even applicable. 
-
The SG replies that if resps' claimed invention is the 
hardware rather than the algorithm contained in the firmware, 
the invention is not novel. The combination of hardware is old 
in the art, as found by the Board and not disturbed on appeal, 
and the only novelty is the algorithm embodied in the 
firmware. Thus under the analysis of Flook still mandates . 
denial of the application. 
5. DISCUSSION. It appears that the directions contained 
in the firmware are a form of computer program. The difference 
between firmware and software, I think, is that a basic program 
is put on the firmware and plac~d permanently inside the 
computer (although firmware can be reprogrammed). Thus a 
r ~-
computer program e ! ts inside the computer af directs the 
computer to perform certain basic functions when carrying out 
other programs. I am uncertain whether the program contained 
on the firmware is an algorithm. In Flook the Court used 
"algorithm" to refer to a "procedure for solving a given type 
of mathematical problem ," 437 U.S., at 585 n.l. The SG's 
definition of algorithm is broader and includes "A fixed 
step-by-step procedure for accomplishing a given result; 
usually a simplified procedure for solving a complex problem, 
also a full statement of a finite number of steps •.•. " See 
Petn 6, n.10. Under the SG's definition the directions 
contained on the firmware would seem to qualify as an 
unpatentable algorithm. 
Assuming that the directions on the firmware are ce unpatentable, which the CCPA did, Flook seems to require 
rejection of the application under 35 U.S.C. 101, if the rest 
of the claimed invention is old in the art. The CCPA appears 
to have rejected this approach, and has considered only whether 
resps' invention as a whole, including the unpatentable 
algorithm, is a new and useful process. If something else 
ab.out resps' invention is inventive, such as the claimed new 
combination of hardware elements, or even the use of a 
firmware/hardware combination, then Flook does not make it 
unpatentable. See 437 U.S., at 594, quoted in Preliminary Memo 
on no. 79-1112. However, the CCPA did not reject the PTO Bd's. 
conclusion that everything about resps' invention but the 
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The dissent in Flook took the position that novelty and 
inventiveness considerations are inappropriate under § 101, and 
the CCPA seems to agree with the dissent. The CCPA stated in 
Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 962-64 (1979), cert. 
granted, No. 79-136 (Oct. 29, 1979), that the SG had 
intentionally misled the Court in Flook into importing novelty 
coni{derations into§ 101. The CCPA stated that, despite 
Flook, "prior art is irrelvant to the determination of 
statutory subject matter under § 101," Id., at 962-63 (emphasis 
in original). The court also opined that Flook might have 
"consequences of unforeseeable magnitude" which were 
"unintended." Id., at 965, 966. 
I think three options are worth considering. This case and 
Diehr could be held for Bergy. It seems inevitable that the 
Court's attention will be focused on Flook in considering 
Bergy, since the Court once remanded Bergy for reconsideration 
in light of Flook. However, it is not likely that Bergy will 
resolve the precise issue presented here. Second, the Court 
could consider summary reversal, as an indication to the CCPA 
that insubordination will not be tolerated. However, I think 
granting the petn in this case and in Diehr is the best 
solution. The CCPA has gone far out on a limb in expressing 
its view that the Court did not anticipate the consequences of 
Flook. Such strong statements of disagreement from a court 
with some expertise in the area probably merit full plenary 
consideration. 
There is a response and a reply. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: October 1 1 , 1980 BradleG RE: No. 79-855, Diamond v. 
Question Presented 
Does 35 U.S.C. § 101 permit issuance of a patent for a 
device, which includes both "hardware" and an accompanying 
microprogram, 
computer? 
that regulates the internal operation of a 
Background 
This case, 1 ike its companion case Diamond v. Die hr, 
involves an application of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
the summary of Flook contained in my 
I will not repeat here 












A computer program is known as "software." The 
physical components of a computer are called "hardware." Within 
the hardware is the computer's memory and its "system base." 
The system base is the storage place for information which 
instructs the computer to perform its tasks. Much of the 
computer's "thinking time" is occupied by trips to the system 
base to receive instructions. Speed is important in high 
performance computers. To save time, some in format ion in the 
system base can be stored in handy ''scratchpad registers." 
These scratchpad registers are not, however, normally accessible 
to the user by means of computer programs. 
data they contain is difficult. 
Thus, changing the 
invention makes it easy to change the data in 
th~ . In addition elements of I 
Resps' 
hardware, the invention 
~
employ ''J~-~~ •·- I a microprogram r,,,_____. 
containing a sequence of basic the memory. When 
activated by software, the instructions cause a particular 
sequence of computer operations to take place. An instruction 
in resps' firmware per mi ts the user to communicate with and 
alter the data in the scratchpad registers. 
The patent examiner rejected the invention under§ 101 
because it involved nonstatutory subject matter under§ 101. He 
found that the only novel aspect of the invention was an 
algorithm -- sequence of formulae designed to direct the 






Board of Appeals agreed. It found that, "save for the 
microprogramming," resps' arrangement of hardware was old in the 
art. According to the Board, a "claim for an improved method of 
calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is 
unpatentable" under Parker v. Flook. In sum, the Board 
concluded that resps' invention consisted of an apparatus old in 
the art coupled with programming which is nonstatutory. 
The CCPA revers~. It noted that resps were claiming 
an "machine or apparatus" composed of a combination of hardware 
elements patentable under§ 101. The court recognized that the 
combination involved a microprogram, and did not reverse the 
Board's finding that everything but the microprogram was old in 
the art. The CCPA thought the proper analysis involved whether 
the claim attempted entirely to preempt use of the algorithm. 
The court found that it did not attempt to do so. The claimed 
invention was not a method of calculation, but rather a method 
of instructing the computer to accomplish certain beneficial 
tasks. The product of the invention was not a solution of an 
equation, as in Flook, but a useful method of running a machine. 
Discussion 
A. Petr's Arguments 
Petr (the Commissioner of Patents) claims that the -
CCPA misapplied Parker v. That case prescribes a two-





step test for 
under 
 
patentable § 101. First, the claim must not recite a ~






remains must be novel. If -- after subtracting out the 
unpatentable scientific components -- what is left is old, the 
claim does not recite statutory subject matter. In this case, 
the Board correctly found that (1) the algorithm was not 
patentable, and ( 2) everything else in the claims was 
conventional. 
(1) Traditional computer programs are not patentable. 7~ 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72-73; Flook, 437 U.S. at 
595. To patent a computer program -- which is, at bottom, 
simply a formal structure describing an idea for problem-solving 
-- is to patent the idea itself. There is no difference between 
a program using an algorithm to solve a mathematical problem and 
using a program, as here, to convey instructions and manipulate 
data within the computer. In each case, the attempt is to 
patent an idea. That this case involves firmware rather than 
software is of no consequence. A program directing a series of 
sequential steps is the essence of both. 
(2) According to Parker v. Flook, resps' invention is 
not patentable if, stripped of the firmware component, nothing 
novel exists in what remains. Here, there is nothing new. The 
hardware components of the claimed invention were old in the 
art, according to the examiner and agency Board of Appeals. The 
CCPA did not disturb that conclusion. Resps are unable to show 
that the agency's conclusions were clearly erroneous. 
B. Resps' Arguments 





machine. Not a computer program. Not an algorithm. Not a ~ 
method of calculation. The inquiry, then, must focus on whether ~ 
the machine falls within§ 101. ~ 
The Commissioner seems to be trying to prohibit ~ 
4..-
patents on any invention even related to a computer. This is ~~ 
incorrect. The invention at issue in this case is not a 
computer program, but a machine that makes a computer work more -.....------. 
efficiently. In other words, the claimed invention is not an 
idea itself, but a machine that carries the idea into effect. 
In sum, the Commissioner ignores the key hardware elements in 
the invention that differentiate this application from one 
attempting to patent a computer program. 
The Commissioner also is erroneously trying to inject 
questions of novelty in § 101 • Of course, novelty is highly 
relevant to the decision to award a patent. But those questions 
should be addressed in§§ 102 and 103. Section 101 deals only 
with the threshold question of whether the invention is 
susceptible to a patent at all. (Even if novelty is thought to 
be relevant under § 101, this invent ion is novel. A remand 
should occur to permit the CCPA to rule on the novelty issue 
that it thought to be irrelevant.) 
C. Criticism and Analysis 
Al though this case and Diehr involve different fact 
settings, the cases are very similar in their components. They 











functions. The Flook analysis -- and that used by the agency in 
this case -- would appear to require a showing that ( 1) the 
invention not describe a natural phenomenon and (2) some 
component, apart from the computer aspect of the invent ion, is 
"new." 
My conclusion in this case is the same as that in 
Diehr. I do not understand why novelty should be relevant under 
§ 101. I should have thought that§§ 102 and 103 were designed 
for that purpose. Thus, I would prefer to clarify Flook and 
explain that novelty is irrelevant under§ 101. 
Assuming that all of Flook' s language remains good 
law, I think a reversal and remand is necessary in this case and 
in Diehr. The CCPA treated novelty as irrelevant and found each 
invention patentable. If novelty is relevant, a remand to the 
CCPA is necessary so that it can review the agency's finding 
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March 4, 1981 
Re: 79-855 - Diamond v. Bradley 
and Franklin 
Dear Chief, 
I agree with the per curiam 
disposition of this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
17--
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
✓ 
- -~u:µumt C!Jcurl itf tirt 'J,ltniub .§tltltg 
~rurfyhtgfon. IH- QJ. 2Dffe'1,.;l 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
March 5, 1981 
Re: 79-855 - Diamond v. Bradley & Franklin 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
-
.:§uvrtntt C!f ottrl cf tlf t 1lnilt~ ~ntlt s 
... a.slp:nglctt, ~- C!f. 21.l~)~;l 
Re: No. 79-855 - Diamond v. Bradley 
Dear Chief: 
March 5, 1981 
The proposed disposition, I suppose, is inevitable. I 
therefore go along with the proposed~ curiam. 
One matter of protocol: Should not the reference to 
your nonparticipation refer to "The Chief Justice" rather 
than to you by name? After all, there is only one. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
SiniZl 
-
- -.:§u:pnmt <!f imrl of flt t 'Jlin:fu b ~ hut .s-
'J,i rur Jrhtgfon, 10. QJ. 20ffe J!. 2 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.,..-
March 5, 1981 
Re: No. 79-855, Diamond v. Bradley & Franklin 
Dear Chief, 
I agree with the proposed disposition 
of this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
7 (. 
' ./ I \ , / 
/ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
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CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.:§upttmt cqomi of iltt ~th laug 
~a£rfyingLm. 1I}. <!J. 20ffeJ!.$ 
March 5, 1981 
Re: No. 79-855 Diamond v. Bradley & Franklin 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your per curiam. 
Sincerely, 
I , . . 
,/ 
.,........----
The Chief Justice 





NOTICE : This opinion Is subject to formal revision before publication 
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are re-
quested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other 
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the pre-
liminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-855 
Sidney A. Diamond, Commissioner 
of Patents and Trademarks, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
John J. Bradley and Benjamin S. 
Franklin. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Customs and Patent 
Appeals. 
[March 9, 1981] 
PER CURIAM. 
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
• - --- - - -- . ·- - --·- -· ~------
THE C' . .T . " · · .T. 13. p 8. B. TI . W. T . :.I. 11 .. \ n. L. F. l'. " ·· I I. H. .I . I' . :-- . 
-- - ·- --- ·----------pc_f;fi ~cg ~cf) r C 9' ~c9 
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